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People act more prosocially when they know they are watched by
others, an everyday observation borne out by studies from
behavioral economics, social psychology, and cognitive neurosci-
ence. This effect is thought to be mediated by the incentive to
improve one’s social reputation, a speciﬁc and possibly uniquely
human motivation that depends on our ability to represent what
other people think of us. Here we tested the hypothesis that social
reputation effects are selectively impaired in autism, a developmen-
tal disorder characterized in part by impairments in reciprocal social
interactions but whose underlying cognitive causes remain elusive.
When asked to make real charitable donations in the presence or
absence of an observer, matched healthy controls donated signiﬁ-
cantly more in the observer’s presence than absence, replicating
prior work. By contrast, people with high-functioning autism were
not inﬂuenced by the presence of an observer at all in this task.
However, both groups performed signiﬁcantly better on a continu-
ous performance task in the presence of an observer, suggesting
intact general social facilitation in autism. The results argue that
people with autism lack the ability to take into consideration what
others think of them and provide further support for specialized
neural systems mediating the effects of social reputation.
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Concern for our own reputation affects how we behave insocial situations. Our actions are strongly inﬂuenced by our
belief that they may be seen and evaluated by others. Not only do
people care about their reputation, but they also often try to
manipulate what other people think of them through self-pre-
sentation or impression management (1), topics with a long
history in social psychology. It is well known that subjects tend to
behave in a more egoistic manner under guaranteed anonymity,
whereas less anonymous situations increase prosocial behaviors
(e.g., giving some beneﬁt to others, adhering to a public standard
or to social norms) (2). Prosocial behaviors can be elicited not
only by the presence of real observers (3–5) but also by sur-
prisingly subtle cues associated with being watched by others (6,
7), pointing to the powerfully automatic nature of reputation-
based processing. Although altruistic behaviors toward nonkin
may be present even in nonhuman primates (8), it is likely that
only human altruistic behavior is affected by the presence of
an independent third party (9). Representing our reputation
involves thinking about what others think of us and thus requires
some level of metarepresentation (10). The link between pro-
social behaviors and reputation is also emphasized by theoretical
and empirical considerations of how altruism might have evolved
through indirect reciprocity (11, 12). Thus, reputation may be
a unique and important aspect of our species that incentivizes
self-interested individuals to conform to social norms.
Autism spectrum disorders (ASD) are a class of neuro-
developmental disorders with an estimated incidence near 1%,
characterized in part by profound impairments in reciprocal
social interactions (13, 14). The social difﬁculties encountered by
people with ASD are especially striking in high-functioning
individuals and are often the single most disabling component in
everyday life. Although the core cognitive processes whose im-
pairment might account for these behavioral deﬁcits remain
unknown, a large body of research has demonstrated impair-
ments in social perception and social cognition in ASD (15), as
well as abnormal structure and function in the associated neural
structures (16). One leading hypothesis is that people with ASD
are impaired in theory-of-mind abilities (the ability to represent
what other people believe, even when those beliefs are false) (17,
18). However, deﬁcits in theory-of-mind abilities are often difﬁcult
to demonstrate experimentally in high-functioning adults. Many
prior studies used tasks in which subjects only observed social
interactions but did not themselves engage in social interactions
(17). Recently, several studies investigated social cognition in
ASD while subjects were actually playing economic games with
a human player (19–21). However, these studies found that the
behavior of people with ASD during prisoner’s dilemma games
(20, 21) and trust games (19) was largely normal, and abnormal-
ities only became apparent when analyzing neuroimaging data
collected during the tasks (19). One recent study (22) found be-
havioral evidence that ASD may feature impairments in a meta-
cognitive ability to recursively represent other’s beliefs about one’s
own beliefs; however, in that study participants interacted with
a complex computer strategy rather than with another person,
leaving it unclear to what extent a speciﬁc deﬁcit in social cogni-
tion might account for the ﬁndings. Taken together, the results to
date suggest that high-functioning people with ASD may be im-
paired selectively in difﬁcult or metacognitive aspects of social
cognition but leave the precise nature of such a process unclear.
We hypothesized that individuals with ASD might have a spe-
ciﬁc deﬁcit in taking into account their reputation in the eyes of
others. This should be apparent in situations in which reputation
works as an incentive for social behavior. The importance of
testing reputation-based effects on social behavior in ASD is
twofold: it may shed light on the speciﬁc processes that account
for real-life social impairments in ASD; and it may provide
a neuropsychiatric dissociation demonstrating the modularity of
reputation-based processing in social behavior. It has been pre-
viously suggested that reputation-based effects could provide
a sensitive measure of impaired social cognition in ASD (23)
based on the ﬁndings of a neuroimaging study with high-func-
tioning ASD (19).
In the present experiment, subjects performed a dictator game
in which they were given an endowment of money and then
presented with a series of choices asking them whether they
wanted to donate variable portions of their money (or none) to
a charity (Donation task; Fig. 1 A and B). Each subject partici-
pated in two conditions (in counterbalanced order): once alone
in the room and once with an unfamiliar person sitting behind
them and observing their choices (with a cover story to explain
why the person was there;Materials and Methods). To control for
nonspeciﬁc effects of the presence of another person, such as
arousal or social facilitation (24), all subjects also performed
a simple continuous performance task (Fig. 1C) in the presence/
absence of the observer.
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Results
We compared a group of 10 high-functioning adults with ASD
with 11 healthy controls matched on age, sex, and intelligence
quotient (IQ) (Table S1). As seen in Fig. 2, when no observer
was present, both control and ASD groups based their donations
on how much money they would lose and how much money the
charity would gain, showing normal preferences for their own
monetary outcomes as well as normal social preferences for
beneﬁtting a charity. We quantiﬁed these ﬁndings with logistic
regressions and found that decisions to accept donations
depended signiﬁcantly both on the cost to the subject and gain to
the charity. For both groups (ASD and controls), monetary loss
for subjects and gain for the charity had signiﬁcant effects on
choices (all P < 0.001). Both groups chose to donate less fre-
quently as the amount of money they had to lose increased but
chose to donate more frequently as the amount of money
beneﬁtting the charity increased (Fig. 2).
To test for the effect of an observer on donation decisions, a 2
(group; ASD or control) × 2 (observer; Presence or Absence)
mixed ANOVA was ﬁrst performed on the number of accepted
donations during the Donation task. It revealed, as predicted,
a signiﬁcant interaction [F(1,19) = 7.03, P = 0.02] (Fig. 3A).
Neither main effects of group nor observer were signiﬁcant [all
P > 0.17, nonsigniﬁcant (n.s.)]. Direct comparisons between
Presence and Absence conditions within each group showed that
whereas our observer manipulation was successful in inducing
more donations in the control group [t(10) = 2.29, P = 0.02], the
ASD group showed a nonsigniﬁcant decrease in donation in the
Presence condition (Fig. 3A).
In addition to effects of an observer on donations, as we found
in the control participants, one would also expect an interaction
between the strength of this observer effect and each individual
participant’s propensity to donate in the ﬁrst place. Plausibly,
those inclined already to donate a lot of money even in the ab-
sence of an observer would not donate much more when ob-
served, whereas those donating little or nothing when alone
might feel more motivated to donate and improve their repu-
tation when observed. We found, in the control group, a highly
signiﬁcant negative correlation between the number of accepted
donations in the Absence condition and the strength of the ob-
server effect (difference in the number of accepted donations
between the Presence and Absence conditions) (r = −0.88, P <
0.001), whereas there was no signiﬁcant correlation in the ASD
group (r = −0.31, P = 0.38, n.s.) (Fig. 3B); the difference be-
tween two correlation coefﬁcients (controls vs. ASD) was also
signiﬁcant (P < 0.05, two-tailed). Although subjects could accept
a theoretical maximum of 48 donation decisions per session, few
accepted donations in which they had to pay more than the
charity would gain (Fig. 1A, blue and cyan cells), a rational be-
havior because they could personally donate the same amount of
money with less cost after the experiment. There is thus likely to
be a psychological ceiling at 28 donation decisions, whereby
personal loss and charity gain are equal (Fig. 1A, red plus yellow
plus green cells). If we exclude those subjects who accepted 28
times or more in the Absence condition, as can be seen in Fig.
3B, six out of seven control subjects showed the observer effect
(more donations in the Presence condition), whereas only one
out of eight ASD subjects showed the effect; this difference in
proportion was signiﬁcant (Fisher exact test, P = 0.009). To
conﬁrm the robustness of the difference in observer effects be-
tween two groups, we ran a linear regression with the difference
in accepted donations (Presence minus Absence conditions) as
the dependent variable and included as regressors age, IQ, sex,
and the number of accepted donations in the Absence condition.
We replicated a signiﬁcant effect of subject group (β = 3.71, P =
0.001) as well as the number of accepted donations in the Ab-
sence condition (β = −0.20, P = 0.003; all other P > 0.24),
conﬁrming that age, IQ, sex, and the intrinsic motivation to
donate (i.e., the number of donations without observation)
cannot account for our reported differences in observer effects
between subject groups. Finally, to control for the possibility that
ASD subjects might simply be perseverating in their decisions,
we investigated possible group differences in the tendency to
switch choices for a given design cell (Fig. 1A) across the two
conditions, but we found no signiﬁcant difference in the mean
number of times they changed their choices (controls = 2.73 vs.
ASD = 2.30; Mann-Whitney U test, P = 0.25, n.s.). Thus, the
tendency to repeat the same choices across the two conditions
did not differ between two groups.
Fig. 1. Experimental tasks. (A) Design of Donation task. In each cell the
number at top left indicates the amount of money subjects lose, and the
number at bottom right indicates the amount of money the charity gains.
Each design cell was implemented twice in each Presence and Absence ses-
sion (i.e., 50 trials). (B) Example of a trial in the Donation task. A small
random jitter was added to each monetary amount. After subjects decided
whether to accept or reject the presented monetary transfer, their choices
were highlighted by a red circle for 1.5 s. (C) Sequence of trials in the CPT. In
each trial, a letter of the alphabet was presented for 0.2 s, and subjects were
asked to press a button only when a letter “X” was presented. Subjects
performed the task continuously for approximately 13 min.
Fig. 2. Proportions of accepted donations in the Absence condition in each
design cell depicted in Fig. 1A. White indicates a high proportion of accepted
donations, whereas black indicates a low proportion.































Reaction Times. Reaction time (RT) data in the Donation task
also showed an effect of the Observer condition in the control
but not ASD group (Fig. 3C). To control for the effect of task
familiarity on RTs, we included the order of the two sessions
(Presence session ﬁrst or Absence session ﬁrst) as another
between-subject factor. A 2 (group) × 2 (observer) × 2 (session
order) mixed ANOVA showed a trend effect for a group ×
observer interaction [F(1,17) = 3.75, P = 0.070] as well as
a signiﬁcant observer × order interaction [F(1,17) = 7.89, P =
0.012]. No other effect was signiﬁcant (all P > 0.22). As a
follow-up, we ran within each subject group a 2 (observer) × 2
(order of session) mixed ANOVA, which revealed main effects
of observer (P = 0.006) and session order (P = 0.008) as well
as their interaction (P = 0.036) in the control group, but no
signiﬁcant effects in the ASD group (all P > 0.12). These
ﬁndings suggest that the group differences in observer effects
we reported earlier are, to some extent, also reﬂected in
RT data.
Continuous Performance Task. We also had participants carry out
a continuous performance task (CPT) in the presence or absence
of an observer, to determine whether the observer effects we
reported above for the donation task truly reﬂect differential
effects of social reputation or a broader deﬁcit in social cognition
in the ASD group (such as an inability even to represent the
presence of another person). For the CPT task, both ASD and
control subjects were highly accurate in detecting target stimuli
(99.4% and 99.6%, respectively), and there was no difference in
overall accuracy. We calculated d′ as the dependent variable for
each subject and ran a 2 (group) × 2 (observer) × 2 (session
order) mixed ANOVA. We found only a signiﬁcant main effect
of observer [F(1,17) = 16.7, P = 0.001], indicating that for both
ASD and control groups their performances were better in the
presence of an observer than when alone (Fig. 3D). The same
mixed ANOVA on response bias revealed no signiﬁcant effect
(all P > 0.28). Furthermore, the mixed ANOVA on RTs during
the CPT revealed only a signiﬁcant main effect of session order
[F(1,17) = 7.10, P = 0.016], indicating that RTs of those who did
the Presence session ﬁrst were faster than those who did the
Absence session ﬁrst, regardless of group.
Questionnaire-Based Measures. The effect of an observer’s pres-
ence on mood was assessed with the Positive and Negative Affect
Schedule (PANAS) (25), a standardized questionnaire assessing
current positive and negative moods. A 2 (group) × 2 (observer)
mixed ANOVA (separately for positive and negative affect)
revealed no signiﬁcant effects on either positive or negative af-
fect (all P > 0.28). Furthermore, within each group, neither
positive nor negative mood were correlated with the number of
accepted donations in each condition (all P > 0.26).
We also administered a postexperiment questionnaire that
provided further personality-related measures (Materials and
Methods). Mean ratings on the Social Desirability scale (26),
a measure of the need for social approval, were no different be-
tween two groups (P = 0.53, two-tailed). Although a prior study
has suggested that individuals scoring higher in their need for
social approval were also more susceptible to observer effects
during prosocial decision making (5), we found no correlation with
the strength of the observer effect on our Donation task in either
subject group (control r = 0.10, n.s., and ASD r = 0.18, n.s.).
We also asked questions measuring attitude toward the charity
we used [United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF)] and their
perception of the social desirability of donating to this charity.
Subject groups did not differ in their attitude (control mean =
5.27 vs. ASD mean = 4.55; P = 0.36, two-tailed) or their per-
ception of social desirability of donating (control mean = 4.55 vs.
ASD mean = 4.90; P = 0.62, two-tailed).
Fig. 3. Results for Donation and CPT tasks. Blue indi-
cates control subjects, and red indicates ASD subjects.
Dark blue/red indicates the Presence condition, and light
blue/red indicates the Absence condition. (A) Mean
number of accepted donations in each Presence and
Absence condition for both groups. (B) Correlations be-
tween the number of accepted donations in the Absence
condition and the susceptibility to the observer effect
(difference in accepted donations between Presence vs.
Absence condition). Higher value in the y axis indicates
more donations in the Presence condition relative to the
Absence condition. Values of the x axis are jittered to
reduce the overlap of points. (C) Mean RTs in the Do-
nation task. (D) Average d′ in CPT. Higher d′ means
higher sensitivity to target stimuli. For A, C, and D,
P values were based on one-tailed paired t tests. Error
bars indicate SEM. *P < 0.05, **P < 0.01, ***P < 0.001.
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Quantifying Observer Behavior. To verify that there was no dif-
ference between subject groups in the behavior of the experi-
menter who was acting as the observer in our study, independent
raters analyzed video recordings that were made covertly during
the Presence session. Coding of these tapes by two independent
coders (who were blind to the group membership of the subject)
conﬁrmed that there was no occasion on which the observer
engaged differentially in any apparent activities (e.g., talking,
coughing, etc). Additionally, after checking each videotape, two
coders were encouraged to guess whether the observer was
watching ASD or control participants; their best guesses were at
chance (Fisher exact test, all P > 0.67), indicating that there was
no detectable difference in the observer’s behavior between the
two groups.
Discussion
The present study showed that whereas control subjects donated
more often in the presence of an observer than when they made
donation decisions alone, ASD subjects showed no such effect (if
anything, a slight trend in the opposite direction). Moreover,
there was a correlation in the controls between how much they
were inclined to donate without observation and the strength of
the observer effect; and there was an effect on RT due to the
presence of the observer. None of these effects were present in
people with ASD. The equivalent social facilitation effects seen
in both groups on a CPT task argue that people with ASD have
intact nonspeciﬁc effects of the presence of another person and
can perceive other people. Taken together, the ﬁndings indicate
that individuals with ASD have a speciﬁc deﬁcit in taking into
account their reputation in the eyes of others.
Might people with ASD be immune to observer effects simply
because they have less empathy for others (less intrinsic motiva-
tion to help others)? We did ﬁnd that ASD features somewhat
fewer donations in general, in addition to the more speciﬁc lack of
an observer effect on these donations (Fig. 3A), even though this
was not a statistically signiﬁcant difference between groups. It has
been well established that ASD features reduced empathy (27,
28), and our ASD sample actually scored signiﬁcantly lower on
Simon Baron-Cohen’s Empathy Quotient than the control group,
whereas there was no difference in Systematizing Quotient (29)
between the two groups (Table S1). However, in the present study,
by keeping the partner of the game identical (UNICEF) and only
manipulating the presence of an observer (thus manipulating only
the extrinsic motivation to donate), any overall differences in
empathy (intrinsic motivation to donate) cannot explain the group
differences on the observer effect that we report.
Further evidence for the speciﬁcity of the impairment in social
reputation processing that we report in ASD comes from the CPT
task. ASD subjects showed a normal effect of the presence of
another person on this task (Fig. 3D), likely indicating a normal
ability of the presence of others to induce increased arousal or
social facilitation (24). This ﬁnding also argues, at least in our
high-functioning group of people with ASD, that basic perception
of the other person was normal, as further conﬁrmed by normal
performances on the Benton Facial Recognition Task (30) (Table
S1). Finally, there were no group differences in mood, need for
approval, attitude toward the charity, or social desirability from
postexperiment questionnaires. We suggest that ASD features
a speciﬁc impairment in representing social reputation—the es-
teem in which others hold us—and in linking social reputation to
the motivation for public prosocial behaviors.
It is intriguing that we found a strong negative correlation in
the control group between the strength of the observer effect and
the number of accepted donations in the Absence condition (Fig.
3B): the less likely healthy people are intrinsically to donate (in
the absence of an observer), the greater their increase in dona-
tions upon being observed. A natural explanation of this pattern
is that it is those participants who donate least who stand to
improve their reputation the most by changing their behavior in
the eyes of others. The lack of such a correlation in the ASD
group provides further evidence for a lack of reputation-based
processing. It is worth noting also that the negative correlation
we found in the controls together with the somewhat lower
overall donations we found in the ASD group also suggest that, if
anything, the group differences in observer effects we found may
have been underestimated.
The RTs of controls, but not ASD participants, were on average
approximately 400 ms faster in the presence of an observer (Fig.
3C). It is unlikely that this effect was due merely to an increase in
attention or arousal in the observer’s presence because we should
have found that effect also in the ASD group, given their normal
social facilitation effects on the CPT task. Instead, we ﬁnd it
plausible that the observer effects on donation RTs seen in the
controls were also driven by social reputation: the faster the de-
cision to donate something, the better the reputation.
What mechanisms might account for ASD individuals’ in-
sensitivity to social reputation? Prior studies have demonstrated
that social reputation can provide a powerful incentive for pro-
social behavior (31) and that the underlying mechanism may re-
cruit general reward-processing regions of the brain (32, 33). That
is, in healthy individuals, improving one’s social reputation acts as
an instrumental reinforcer because better social reputation is re-
warding.We think that there are at least two possible explanations
for this deﬁcit in ASD individuals. The ﬁrst possibility is that they
can represent the presence of an observer but may be unable to
take the extra metacognitive step of representing what the ob-
server thinks of them (reputation). The second possibility is that
they can represent the observer as well as their reputation but lack
normal social reward processing. That is, social reputation may
not be rewarding and would thus fail to inﬂuence their behavior in
our task. Past reports on ASD individuals’ difﬁculty in repre-
senting the mental states of others (17, 18) suggest that they may
lack the metacognitive ability to understand the reputation they
have with others (10, 23, 34) and thus favor the ﬁrst explanation.
However, there are also ﬁndings that although people with high-
functioning ASD can attribute mental states to others if explicitly
asked to, they fail to do so spontaneously (35), suggesting that
there may be a primary motivational deﬁcit. Consistent with this
idea is a recent ﬁnding that stimuli that are normally social re-
warding (smiling faces) fail to activate reward circuitry in children
with autism (36). Future studies will be required to disentangle
precisely at which stage of processing the deﬁcit occurs that we
report here (see below for a possible idea).
The present results demonstrate that prosocial behavior in
ASD is insensitive to the effects of an observer, supporting the
hypothesis that ASD features impaired processing of social
reputation. This may well account for some of the real-world
social deﬁcits of ASD, but there remain several important topics
for future investigation. First, it will be important to extend the
present ﬁndings to other circumstances encountered in everyday
life. Although our study focused on the good side of the observer
effect (increased prosocial behavior), there is also its dark side:
one sometimes feels more anonymous in a large crowd (exhib-
iting less concern for reputation). The presence of many other
people could therefore lead to less prosocial performance (e.g.,
social loaﬁng; ref. 37) or to increased antisocial behavior (e.g.,
deindividuation; ref. 38). Testing these phenomena in people
with ASD could provide additional evidence for their insen-
sitivity to the presence of other people.
Relatedly, it will be important to link the present ﬁndings from
a somewhat contrived situation in the laboratory to real-world
clinical relevance. Do people with ASD evidence insensitivity to
the presence of other people in real-world contexts? Addition-
ally, are such deﬁcits mediated by impaired social reputation
processing? The present results support such a hypothesis, but
additional studies that carefully characterize actual real-world































behavior will be required to deﬁnitively establish this link.
Plausibly, high-functioning people with ASD will show impaired
social reputation effects under some circumstances (such as
those in our experiment) but not others (such as those providing
additional explicit and contextual cues on the basis of which
compensatory processing might take place). We thus take the
present ﬁndings as only the ﬁrst step and acknowledge that
impairments in social reputation processing may well be het-
erogeneous in ASD and may be partly compensated in high-
functioning individuals if more explicit cues are present.
A second important topic for future investigation is to charac-
terize the behavior of people with ASD in other economic games
that provide the opportunity for reputation. As we noted earlier,
prior studies using trust games (19) and prisoner’s dilemma games
(20, 21) have failed to show a clear difference between ASD and
control groups, but subjects in those studies played multiple rounds
of a game with the same partner. Repeated matching with a partner
involves “direct” reciprocity, fulﬁlling a personal obligation to
a speciﬁc individual. This kind of interaction does not require salient
judgments of how one’s behavior inﬂuences one’s social reputation
in the eyes of a more distant observer or in the eyes of people
generally. Because our present results highlight an impairment in
sensitivity to social reputations that noninteractive observers hold,
people with ASD might well perform abnormally in repeated co-
operation games in large groups in which players are matched
randomly with one another. Studies in healthy populations indicate
that in games relying on single interactions with a partner, people do
behave more prosocially, provided that a reputation system guar-
antees that their behavioral history becomes known to future part-
ners (an instance of “indirect reciprocity”) (39). In a game like this,
the primary motivation for players to act prosocially may not be
good reputation per se but money into which good reputation is
converted (i.e., players with good reputations usually get more co-
operation from others and end upmakingmoremoney at the end of
the experiment). Therefore, as long as subjects possess the ability to
form a metarepresentation of how one is generally viewed by pos-
sible future players (and money is rewarding to them), individuals
cooperate even if a good reputation is per se not rewarding. Thus, by
comparing how participants with ASDmight behave in such a game
with vs. without a reputation system, it might be possible to tell
whether their deﬁcit is primarily cognitive or motivational.
Third, it will be important in future studies to further delineate the
neural underpinnings of the behavioral effect we report here, which
might provide considerable insight into its underlying mechanism.
Prior studies have pointed to structures such as the cingulate cortex
in representing one’s own intentions (40) and have documented
speciﬁcally abnormal cingulate activation corresponding to such self-
relevant processing in autism (19). Other candidate structures that
may contribute to the impaired social reputation processing of ASD
include parts of medial and polar prefrontal cortex involved in
metacognitive representation (10), which have been implicated in
reputation processing in healthy individuals (33, 41), as well as white
matter connectivity that serves to link the various representations
required and that is likely to be impaired in autism (42).
Materials and Methods
Subjects. Twenty-four subjects participated in the present study. The reported
analyses were based on 21 subjects: 10 subjects with ASD (2 female) and 11
age- and IQ-matched controls (1 female; Table S1). One ASD and 2 control
subjects were excluded from the analysis because they repeatedly rejected
choices on the trials that involved no cost to themselves (there are 16 such
trials in total across two sessions; Fig. 1A, red cells), raising the concern that
they did not understand the task correctly. All ASD participants met the
Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, Revised 4th Edition
diagnostic criteria for autism or Asperger syndrome and met the cutoff
scores for autism or Asperger syndrome on the Autism Diagnostic Obser-
vation Schedule, Module 4 (43). We could also collect the Autism Diagnostic
Interview–Revised (44) from seven ASD subjects, and all seven of them met
the cutoff scores on this scale (Table S1). Participants gave informed consent
to participate in the studies under a protocol approved by the Institutional
Review Board of the California Institute of Technology.
Experimental Tasks. The experiment consisted of two sessions. In each session,
subjects performed a Donation task and a CPT in counterbalanced order, and
they also answered a mood questionnaire (PANAS) at the end; additional
questionnaireswereadministeredat theveryendof theexperiment (seebelow).
Our primary dependent measure of interest came from performance on
a Donation task (Fig. 1 A and B), in which subjects performed a dictator game
in which the amount of money subjects themselves lost and the amount of
money gained by the charity were independently manipulated (range $0 to
$16 by an increment of $4; Fig. 1A). In each trial, participants had to accept or
reject a monetary transfer presented on the screen. To minimize the effect of
memory (simply repeating the same choices between Presence and Absence
sessions), the actual amount of money presented in each trial during the
experiment was jittered (Fig. 1B) by adding a random number drawn from
a normal distribution with a mean and SD of 0 and 0.3, respectively. Jittering
was not added if the original amount was $0. Only for diagonal cells (green
cells in Fig. 1A), exactly the same amount of jittering was added to both the
money subjects lose and the money the charity gains, so that in these trials
the amount of money subjects lose was always equal to the amount of
money the charity gains. Each design cell was implemented twice in each of
the Presence and Absence sessions (i.e., 50 trials each) in randomized order.
After each decision, chosen options (“Accept” or “Reject”) were highlighted
by a red circle, to ensure that choices were clearly observable by the observer
in the Presence condition. All subjects were given $45 as an endowment at
the beginning of the experiment and told that one trial would be randomly
chosen at the end of the experiment, and their decision on that trial was
implemented (including real donations to UNICEF through the Internet).
As a comparison task, we used a CPT that engaged multiple cognitive
processes and required sustained attention and vigilance but did not have any
social aspect (45). During the task, subjects were presented with letters one
at a time on the screen and were asked to press a key every time they saw
the letter “X.” Each letter was presented for 200 ms (1,000-ms interstimulus
interval). The total duration of the test was ≈13 min (646 trials in total), and
the target letter (“X”) was presented in 26.5% of all trials. For both Donation
and CPT tasks, stimuli were presented using MATLAB with Psychtoolbox.
Experimental Procedure and Observer Manipulation. In one session, subjects’
performances were constantly observed by an observer, whereas in the other
session they completed the tasks alone. At the beginning of the experiment
a male experimenter gave instructions for both the Donation and CPT tasks
and provided information about the mission of UNICEF and how the money
donated will be used. Next, subjects performed a brief practice session for
both tasks before the actual experiment. During the instruction, the exper-
imenter was blind to the upcoming order of sessions (Presence or Absence
session ﬁrst), of which he was informed during the practice session. If the
ﬁrst session was the Absence session, the experimenter left the room after he
set up the presentation program, and subjects performed the Donation and
CPT tasks and completed a PANAS questionnaire alone in the room.
If the ﬁrst session was the Presence session, the experimenter set up a task
presentation program and left the room. However, the program in this condition
was programmed to simulate a crash after approximately 1 to 2 min: after 8
donation trials (if they performed Donation task ﬁrst) or 28 CPT trials (if they
performedCPTﬁrst), the task screen suddenlydisappeared, and subjects sawerror
messageswritten in red fonton theMATLABcommandwindowandheardabeep
sound. When this occurred, all subjects except one ASD subject spontaneously
cameoutof the roomandreported to theexperimenter that the taskhadcrashed.
For the single ASD subject who did not come out, the experimenter entered the
room ≈5 min after he had left and asked the subject if everything was ﬁne; the
ASD participant reported that he was about to go out. In each case, the experi-
menter apologized for the malfunction and asked subjects to wait in a different
room while, ostensibly, he was ﬁxing the task program.
After ≈5 min of waiting, subjects were asked to come back to the ex-
perimental room, and the experimenter brieﬂy introduced an unfamiliar
male research assistant they had never met before (a confederate who
played the role of observer). Subjects were told that because it was not
certain that the program was completely ﬁxed and that all data would be
correctly saved, this technician would stay in the room with them and watch
and write down their choices during the Donation task just to be sure that
the data were recorded (subjects were also told that the observer would not
record their performance during the CPT, but stay there in case the program
crashed again). The observer quietly sat ≈3 feet diagonally behind the
subject throughout the session. Although subjects had a vague sense of the
observer behind them, the computer monitor they were facing was not
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glossy, and they could not see the reﬂected observer’s face or small body
motions during the experiment. To verify that there was no difference in the
observer’s behavior between the two subject groups, the observer was
videotaped through a one-way mirror by a video camera placed in the next
room (the one-way mirror was mostly covered by a blind and a white board,
rendering it completely inconspicuous). While being observed by the ob-
server, subjects completed the two tasks and PANAS. When they ﬁnished
all tasks, the observer thanked subjects and left the room to inform the
experimenter.
After completing the ﬁrst session, each subject participated in a variety of
other experiments in our laboratory that were part of different ongoing
studies in autism research (e.g., answering personality questionnaires,
preference judgments of various stimuli, etc). There was no systematic dif-
ference in what intervening tasks were performed between the two subject
groups. After completing these other experiments, subjects took a brief break
and then started the second session. Therefore, the two sessions of the
present experiment were separated by 50–70 min.
At the beginning of the second session, the experimenter brieﬂy instructed
subjects to complete the same two tasks again. If the second session was the
Absence session, subjects were told that the program had been thoroughly
ﬁxed, and they completed the tasks and PANAS alone in the room. On the
other hand, if the second session was the Presence session, the above-
mentioned procedure was followed (i.e., the presentation program crashed,
and an observer was introduced), and subjects competed the tasks in the
presence of an observer.
The order of the two sessions (Presence or Absence sessions) and the order
of the two tasks (Donation task or CPT) was counterbalanced across subjects,
and within each subject the order of the two tasks was ﬁxed across the
two sessions.
After completing the second session, subjects moved to a different room,
and they answered the Social Desirability Scale (26), which measures people’s
tendency to respond in a socially desirable manner, and two follow-up
questions: “Towhat extent do you think themission of UNICEF is important?”
and “To what extent do you think that making a donation to UNICEF is so-
cially desirable?” The ﬁrst question measured subjects’ personal attitude
toward the charity, and the second one was intended to measure their per-
ception of how the charity is valued by a society or other people. All of these
questions were answered using a 7-point scale. Subjects were also askedwhat
they thought was the purpose of the experiment they had just completed. No
subject mentioned any purpose involving effects of an observer, and no
subject thought that the crash of the program was intentional. Finally, one
trial was selected and their choice on that trial was implemented.
Analysis. For Donation task data, we excluded two 0–0 trials (Fig. 1A, gray
cell) in each session from the analysis and analyzed donation decisions and
RTs for the remaining 48 trials. For CPT data, we computed d′ and response
bias separately for each session for each subject. RTs in correct trials were
also analyzed. For RT analysis for both tasks, within each individual subject,
RTs deviating from the subject’s mean by more than 3SDs were excluded
from further analysis.
Because of the a priori expected direction of the observer effects (i.e.,
better performance in CPT, more “Accept” in the Donation task in the
Presence session), one-tailed P values are reported (unless otherwise speci-
ﬁed) when comparing the Presence vs. Absence sessions.
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